Symposium on MLETR and blockchains

I gave a paper in a symposium on the UNCITRAL MLETR (Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records) and blockchains (<a href=”https://www.waseda.jp/folaw/icl/news-en/2019/02/12/6519/”>Here is link</a> to the program) on 16 March 2019 at the Waseda University in Tokyo.

The proceedings were conducted in Japanese except the presentation by Luca Castellani, the legal officer of the UNCITRAL Secretariat who was responsible for this Model Law. So my powerpoint slides and handout (below) are also in Japanese.

I have underscored the potential of public blockchains for disrupting the society and considered whether they meet the requirements of the MLETR. Throughout the analysis, I have compared public blochains with permissioned blockchains and central registries. Each of the requirements of the MLETR poses an analytical challenge with respect to public blockchains.
I will try to write an English version of the paper once I have cleared a backlog of work on my desk.


Bahraini legislation based on the UNCITRAL MLETR

Bahrain became the first to enact a statute based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Transferable Records. I have been provided with an English translation of the statute by Jameel Al Alawi, Senior Legal Adviser for the Bahrain Economic Development Board, who was in charge of drafting the statute. With his permission, I post it below.

The Model Law sets out the conditions which must be met for an electronic record to be treated as a “transferable document” (Article 10). The latter is defined as a document that entitles the holder to claim the performance of the obligation indicated in the document and to transfer the right to performance by means of the transfer of that document (Article 2). Bills of lading and warehouse receipts, for example, are covered.

The Model Law adheres to the principle of technology neutrality, which means that the law should neither require nor assume the use of a particular technology for communicating or storing information electronically. Thus, the blockchain technology is not excluded from the Model Law’s scope of application. It is in fact a technology well suited for creating and managing electronic records which purport to replicate transferable documents because it is capable of guaranteeing that there is a single true version of electronic records. 

The Model Law requires the use of a reliable method to establish an exclusive control of an electronic record that replicates a transferable document (Articles 10(1)(b)(i)(ii) and 11(1)(a)). In my previous work, I noted:

The reliability of the above-mentioned methods will be assessed by adjudicators on an ex post (i.e. after the occurrence of a dispute) basis. It would, however, be unfortunate if there were no foreseeability as to which methods would pass the reliability test since the use of such methods would then be deterred. A thought should, therefore, be given to the possibility of compiling a list of reliable methods on an ex ante basis. Such a list would need to be reviewed from time to time because neither the configuration of a central registry nor the algorithm of a blockchain is permanently fixed.

The Model Law lists a number of circumstances by reference to which to evaluate the reliability of a method, including the existence of a declaration by an accreditation body (Article 12(a)(vi)). But it leaves the details to the national laws.

What is interesting about the Bahraini legislation is that it provides for the accreditation of an “operator”, the latter being defined as a person who operates an information system for managing electronic transferable records (Article 1(l)). It sets forth the procedure and conditions for accreditation (Articles 15 and 16), though it delegates to the competent authority to lay out the details of the conditions by means of a regulation. It also provides for the withdrawal of an accreditation. Once an operator is accredited, the reliability of the method used by the operator is to be presumed unless evidence to the contrary is adduced (Article 8(2)). Furthermore, where reliance on an electronic transferable record has caused damage and the electronic record is managed by an accredited operator, it is to be presumed that the damage was due to the operator’s intention or negligence unless otherwise proven (Article 17).

The Bahraini legislation is applicable to electronic transferable records “whether or not an operator is used in respect of these records” (Article 2(1)). Accordingly, it seems applicable to electronic transferable records managed with the use of the blockchain technology. In view of the definition of an “operator” (Article 1(l)), it seems unlikely that any accreditation will be issued with respect to public blockchains. But the administrator of a private blockchain may fall within that definition. It will be interesting to see whether the conditions for accreditation issued by the competent authority will actually cover private blockchains as well as central registries.

Postscript (15 Feb. 2019): Jameel has informed me that the Bahraini statute entered into force on 1 February 2019 but the regulation is still being debated.

 

"Implications of the Blockchain Technology for the UNCITRAL Works" – published.

It has come to my attention that my article “Implications of the Blockchain Technology for the UNCITRAL Works” had been published from the United Nations in November last year.
The 50th anniversary Congress was a big occasion for UNCITRAL and it was my great honour to be part of it.
Here is my article excerpted from the book.

An additional note: In my original manuscript, there were some references to specific chapter numbers. I have noticed that in the published version, they have been changed to “Ch. 0” due to the editorial work which has removed all the chapter numbers from the headings. To see where those were actually referring to, please consult my original manuscript here.

"Blockchain Technology for Letters of Credit and Escrow Arrangements" – published.

Here is the published version of my article “Blockchain Technology for Letters of Credit and Escrow Arrangements” (2018)135-2 Banking Law Journal pp.89-103.

The analysis is multi-layered, with up to three levels of headings. To aid readability, I gave chapter numbers in my original manuscript (See the unedited version attached to my previous post). But because the numbering is not compatible with the journal’s style of headings, the experienced editor has come up with an alternative solution. Though it may have compromised readability somewhat, I hope that the structure of the article is still clear to the readers.

Blockchain Technology for Letters of Credit and Escrow Arrangements

Here is an article I have written on the basis of my presentation at the conference “Supply Chain Finance and the Changing Landscape of International Trade” held at the Gothenburg University (Sweden) on 23 October 2017.

An additional note (25 Nov 2017): This article has been accepted for publication from the Banking Law Journal and, after editing, is scheduled (tentatively) to appear in the February 2018 issue. The unedited Word version is kept here with permission.

Implications of the Blockchain Technology for the UNCITRAL Works

I will be presenting my thoughts on the subject above in the upcoming Congress of the UNCITRAL for the celebration of its 50th anniversary (4-6 July 2017).
My paper currently on the Congress website is a version which I sent to the UNCITRAL Secretariat some months ago and which no longer represents my latest thinking in some significant respects. I am asking the Secretariat to replace it with the latest version, to which I make a link from here
The paper gives a particular emphasis on the topic of proprietary restitution of blockchain-based tokens as an area which calls for a globally unified solution.
Postscript: As from 16 June, the Congress website carries the latest version. Many thanks to the Secretariat for swiftly acting on my request. 

Blockchain Technology and Electronic Transferable Records

Here is the powerpoint file for my presentation at the seminar “Electronisation of Transferable Documents or Instruments Used in International Trade” (10-11 March 2016) in Singapore (organised by UNCITRAL, Attorney-General’s Chambers of Singapore and the Association of Banks in Singapore (ABS)).

Work of UNCITRAL on electronic transferable records

Since 2011, the UNCITRAL has been working on legal issues relating to the use of electronic transferable records. From the beginning, it envisages two approaches to establishing the identity of the person to whom an electronic transferable record is issued or transferred, namely the token model which identifies the person in the record itself and the registry model which identifies the person in a separate registry (A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.115 (hereafter “the 2011 document”) at para. 48). Like its previous works on electronic commerce, the UNCITRAL is adhering to the principle of technology neutrality (Id. at para. 35) and nowhere in the official documents published to date could I find any mention of blockchain, cryptocurrency or bitcoin. But I think the work should be pursued with the blockchain technology in mind so as to facilitate its applications to replace paper-based transferable documents such as bills of lading.
In the current draft of a model law (A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.135/Add.1, August 2015), the exclusive control of an electronic transferable record is treated as functionally equivalent to the possession of a paper-based transferable document. Thus Draft Article 17(1) provides:
Where the law requires the possession of a paper-based transferable document or instrument, that requirement is met with respect to an electronic transferable record if:
(a) A method is used to establish exclusive control of that electronic transferable record by a person and to reliably [identify] [establish] that person as the person in control; and
(b) The method used is either:
(i) As reliable as appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic transferable record was generated, in light of all the relevant circumstances, including any relevant agreement; or
(ii) Proven in fact to have fulfilled the functions described in subparagraph (a) above, by itself or together with further evidence.

In the Remarks which accompany this provision, the Secretariat makes some noteworthy comments. It says, “the electronic transferable record in itself does not necessarily identify the person in control, but rather the method or system employed to establish control as a whole performs that function” (Id. at para. 22.). This understanding may simply be intended to cater for the registry model as described in the 2011 document. But it may also open the door to blockchain-based electronic records which may be seen as ill-fitted with the description in the 2011 document of the token model. 

The Secretariat goes on to say, “identification should not be understood as implying an obligation to name the person in control, as the draft Model Law allows for the issuance of electronic transferable records to bearer, which implies anonymity” (Ibid.). This view will also ease the way for the blockchain technology as the latter permits the holders of electronic records to remain anonymous. 
The Secretariat also notes, “reference to the person in control of the electronic transferable record does not imply that that person is also the rightful person in control of that record as this is for substantive law to determine” (Id. at para. 21). In other words, the exclusive control of an electronic transferable record is only equivalent to the possession of a paper-based transferable document. Put in the context of the blockchain technology, this view seems consistent with my opinion that the ownership of a blockchain-based electronic record cannot be determined simply by reference to who has the exclusive control of it (See my earlier post).
The Secretariat proceeds to say, “reference to the person in control does not exclude the possibility of having more than one person in control.” It is not easy to see what this observation means for a blockchain-based electronic record. The latter is under the exclusive control of the person holding the private key for the address in which the record is kept. It is, on the other hand, possible for one private key to be known by a number of persons.